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ABSTRACT

With West Virginia having just become the twenty-sixth state to pass right-towork (RTW) legislation, the U.S. labor relations movement is at a tipping point. Other
policy makers are closely watching the recent revival of RTW laws that has occurred
over the last five years and are analyzing relevant studies to determine whether passing
legislation that would outlaw union shops in their states might be worth a second look.
With this paper I intend to examine one of the dominant arguments against
enacting RTW legislation in a state, which is that this legislation results in a greater
degree of state-level income inequality. I will also analyze the effects of RTW legislation
on real per capita disposable income levels.

Keywords: right-to-work, income inequality, economics, econometrics
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With West Virginia having just become the twenty-sixth state to pass right-towork (RTW) legislation, the U.S. labor relations movement is at a tipping point. Other
policy makers are closely watching the recent revival of RTW laws and are analyzing
relevant studies to determine whether passing legislation that would outlaw union shops
in their states might be worth a second look.
The current literature is largely divided concerning the effects of RTW legislation
on a state’s economy. Many supporters of this legislation claim that RTW states
experience greater economic growth and higher employment rates than non-RTW states.
Those who oppose this legislation claim that it leads to greater income inequality by
weakening union bargaining power, ultimately reducing wages for low-skilled workers.
While researchers have extensively examined the extent to which RTW
legislation affects employment rates, wages, and union membership rates, very few
researchers have examined whether or not RTW legislation contributes to an increase in
income inequality for these states. The primary focus of this paper is to evaluate whether
one of the arguments most frequently used by opponents of RTW legislation is actually
supported by empirical evidence.
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CHAPTER 2

LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT

The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made it illegal to require employees to be union
members as a prior condition to their employment. This type of arrangement was known
in industrial relations as a “closed shop” arrangement. However, arrangements known as
“union shops” are still legal in the United States today even though they are almost
unheard of in the rest of the industrialized world. Union shop arrangements are a form of
union security clause in which workers must join a labor union within a designated time
frame after their hire date and pay union membership dues as a condition of their
continued employment.
Although the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 did not abolish union shops, the act
granted individual states the power to pass legislation that would make union shops
illegal in facilities operating within their borders. These states, also known as RTW
states, typically have employment arrangements known as “open shop” agreements
where workers are free to choose to be union members or not at no risk to their
employment status with the company. Workers in a RTW state are also exempt from
paying union dues should they choose not to be a union member unless specific
arrangements, known as “agency shop” agreements, are negotiated between the union
and the company. Agency shop agreements require workers to pay a fee to cover the
costs of collective bargaining whether or not a worker is actually a union member. This
2

type of arrangement is designed to combat workers who receive all of the benefits of a
collective bargaining agreement but contribute nothing to help cover a union’s expenses
for negotiating such an agreement.
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CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is an extensive amount of existing research on the economic effects of right
to work legislation, but the existing research is largely divided on the issue. Most of the
debate within the literature arises from methodological differences in how the researchers
attempt to control for unobservable state-level variables in their models. Much of the
differences in results can be attributed to the different methodologies used and how they
impact the results of the empirical studies. Moore (1998) cautions that individual findings
related to the economic impact of RTW legislation is highly sensitive to model
specification.
Many empirical studies are primarily focused on identifying a relationship
between RTW legislation and wages. Some studies specifically set out to examine union
wages while others examine average wages for the entire state. Most researchers agree
that average wages in RTW states are lower than average wages in non-RTW states.
Gould and Kimball (2015) followed up research conducted by Gould and Shierholz
(2011) about the compensation disparities in RTW states. These studies controlled for
differences in the cost of living between RTW states and non-RTW states as well as
demographic differences between the populations which would affect average wages for
the states. For example, in the sample of RTW states, the average level of educational
attainment was lower than in non-RTW states and there was a larger demographic
4

composition of minority populations which, on average, receive lower wages. Both
reports stated that wages are higher for union and non-union workers in non-RTW states
than in RTW states. However, the authors admit that there may be some unobservable
state-level characteristics other than those controlled for in the study that may lead to
lower compensation for workers in a RTW state.
Sherk (2015) in his testimony for the Wisconsin Senate agreed that, on average,
RTW states have lower wages than non-RTW states and hypothesized about some of the
unobserved state-level characteristics that may attribute to this phenomenon that were not
included in the model used by Gould and Kimball (2015). While Sherk (2015) agreed
that cost-of-living adjustments are necessary when comparing RTW states and non-RTW
states, he also stated that The Heritage Foundation recreated the analysis done by Gould
and Kimball (2015) and found that their research contained mistakes concerning the
state-level control variables used in the model and measurement errors in their cost-ofliving variables. Once corrected, Sherk (2015) confirmed that The Heritage Foundation
found no statistically significant correlation between wages and RTW legislation.
In contrast to the Gould and Kimball (2015) study which found a negative
relationship between RTW legislation and wages and The Heritage Foundation’s study
communicated by Sherk (2015) which found no relationship at all, Reed (2003) analyzed
state-level data to conclude that wages in RTW states were actually higher than wages in
non-RTW states when one controls for state economic conditions prior to the RTW
policy change. Reed (2003) points out in his discussion that states that adopt RTW
legislation are typically poorer than other states and therefore have a historical trend of
lower wages for various reasons. He then argues that failure to control for this may be the
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reason why some studies have found a negative relationship between wages and RTW
legislation. Sherk (2015) also examines the relationship between RTW legislation and
state unemployment levels, finding that RTW legislation can be linked to a significant
reduction in unemployment levels in these states.
Eren and Ozbeklik (2016) conducted a case study of Oklahoma using the recently
developed synthetic control method to examine private sector wages and employment
rate as well as private sector unionization rates before and after RTW legislation was
passed in the state. Their analysis showed that RTW legislation had a negative impact on
private sector unionization rates in Oklahoma and had no short run impact on total
employment and average wages for Oklahoma’s private sector. The narrow scope of this
study is a limitation in that it only examines Oklahoma and does not account for the
effects RTW legislation has had on other states that have adopted the same legislation.
While a majority of the research in done on RTW legislation involves the policy’s
effect on wages, there are a few other studies which delve into other economic issues. In
his literature review of the economic effects of RTW legislation, Moore (1998) divides
the areas of interest in the literature into five main categories. In his synopsis of the
current literature up to that time, Moore stated that the empirical studies concerning RTW
legislation predominantly dealt with one of the following topics: the impact of RTW
legislation on unionization and union organizing efforts and successes, determinants of
RTW legislation, the extent of free riding in RTW states, the influence of RTW
legislation on state levels of industrial development, and the effects of RTW legislation
on wages. From our previous discussion, we can surmise that more recent studies have
been primarily focused on the effects of RTW legislation on wages and employment and
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have used these measures as a basis for broader assumptions about the overall impact of
RTW policies on states’ economic health.
Very few studies of the economic effects of RTW legislation stray beyond an
examination of wages and employment. One notable study that goes further, examines
how RTW legislation affects industrial development in a state. A study conducted by
Holmes (1998) examined the borders between RTW states and non-RTW states to
determine the differences in location decisions made by manufacturing facilities. This
study used RTW policy decisions to classify a state as either a pro-business or antibusiness toward manufacturing. State-level characteristics that might affect
manufacturing activity other than the RTW policy decision were controlled for through
the use of border counties which would have similar geographic conditions and
demographic populations. Holmes (1998) found that there was a significant correlation
between RTW legislation and manufacturing activity between bordering states. He then
theorized that an increase in industrial development would positively impact a state’s
economic outlook by increasing employment and long-term wages.
My research aims to broaden the scope of analysis even further than the studies
mentioned above. I use state-level data to determine how RTW legislation affects states’
real per capita disposable income levels and the degree of income inequality within the
states.
Currently there are only two other papers which examine how RTW legislation
affects income inequality. The first paper, written by Nieswiadomy, Slottje, and Hayes
(1991), utilizes a simultaneous equations model and state-level Gini coefficients
calculated from data taken from the Census of the Population in 1970 and again in 1980.
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The study found that states with RTW laws appeared to have higher levels of income
inequality in 1970, but found no significant difference between levels of income
inequality in RTW states when compared with non-RTW states in 1980.
A current working paper of the American Enterprise for Public Policy Research
adopted the Synthetic Control Method to examine the effects of RTW legislation on
state-level income inequality (Jordan, et al. 2016). The authors reported that RTW
legislation did not contribute to the worsening of income inequality in Louisiana, Idaho,
Texas, and Oklahoma (Jordan, et al. 2016).
This paper addresses the same question concerning the relationship between RTW
legislation and state-level income inequality; however, this paper utilizes the Ordinary
Least Squares method, which is different than the methods used by either of the previous
studies discussed above. This study has an advantage over the study conducted by
Nieswiadomy, Slottje, and Hayes (1991) due to the availability of more data, including
additional states that have changed to RTW states since 1991, and yearly state-level Gini
coefficients rather than Gini coefficients calculated once every ten-year census period.
The study conducted by Jordan, et al. examines income inequality using Louisiana,
Idaho, Texas, and Oklahoma, while the study presented in this paper focusses on
Michigan, Indiana, and Oklahoma.
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CHAPTER 4

DATA SOURCES

Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001) estimated union membership and union
coverage rates by state which were published in The Monthly Labor Review. Both
measurements were taken because union membership and union coverage rates can
actually be quite different in RTW states where workers can choose to be a union
member or not at no risk to their employment with the company. The models used in this
study focus on union membership rates, which are more likely to change as a result of
RTW legislation than union coverage rates; however, union coverage rates were also
examined.
Education levels and state-level Gini coefficients were taken from Frank (2009).
The percentage of the population that graduated from college was used as a measurement
for educational attainment, with the assumption that these college graduates would also
have graduated from high school or earned an equivalent level of education.
Gini coefficients are used in the model as a measure of income inequality within a
state. While Gini coefficients accurately measure the spread of how income is distributed
throughout a state’s population, a weakness of using the Gini coefficient measure is that
it is a relative measure that ignores absolute wealth. The Gini coefficient cannot tell
specifically how income inequality is changing, only that the spread of income
distribution is getting wider or smaller. For example, it could be that the degree of
9

income inequality is getting higher while the absolute wealth is also increasing for the
entire population.
Real per capita disposable income levels for the time period were taken from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015). Gross state product levels were also obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015) from 1963 to 2014. It should be noted here that
there is a break in this dataset in 1997 due to differences in calculation methods used
before and after this date as well as sources of the data used for these calculations. Gross
state product figures between 1963 and 1997 were calculated using the SIC industry
definitions while the figures between 1997 and 2014 were calculated using NAICS
industry definitions, which redefined several income components for gross state product.
The discontinuity in the data limited the focus of this study to the NAICS definitions of
gross state product from 1997 to 2014, during which time only three states passed RTW
legislation. Having only three states within the sample time period that passed RTW
legislation is certain to affect the reliability of the results, even assuming that most of the
economic effects of RTW legislation would be most evident in the years following the
passing of such legislation,
State-level data for civilian population, labor force, employment rates, and
unemployment rates were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.). Data
concerning which states have passed RTW legislation and when that legislation was
passed was gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2016). This
information is summarized in Figure 1, which illustrates a map of the current RTW states,
and Table 2, which provides a comprehensive list of the RTW states and the dates when
the legislation was enacted in those states.
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Summary statistics for this collection of data can be found in Table 1. The Gini
coefficients range from zero, which represents perfect equality, to one, which represents
perfect inequality. The Gini coefficients in this dataset range from .526 to .733.
Measurements of each of the variables were taken for all fifty states and the District of
Columbia for each year from 1997 to 2014, resulting in 867 observations. Population
density was calculated by dividing the state population for each year by the number of
square miles within that state. The average employment rate during this time period was
62.96%. The percent of the population that earned a bachelor’s degree ranged from 9.8%
to 45.3% during the period, which is reflective of the upward trend toward higher
education between 1997 and 2014. The gross state product figures are measured in
millions of chained 2009 dollars. Over the time period, the average gross state product
was roughly $268.694 billion dollars. Per capita disposable income was measured in real
dollars and ranged from $17,277 to as much as $59,529.
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CHAPTER 5

ECONOMETRICS MODEL

An estimation of the impact of RTW legislation on per capita disposable income
within a state can be estimated by the following model:

Per Capita Disposable Incomeit = βo + β1RTWit + δΖit + λt + αi + εit

(1)

The independent variable RTW is a dummy variable for each state (t) that is equal
to one if the state had an established RTW policy in the year (i) and zero if the state did
not. If a state passed RTW legislation prior to June 30th, the date from the current year
was used to determine the dummy variable. The year following the date RTW legislation
was passed in the state was used if the legislation was passed after June 30th of that year.
The other independent variables in the model are denoted by (δΖit). These independent
variables include population density, employment rate, educational attainment at the
collegiate level, union membership rates, and gross state product.
A second model, shown below, is used to estimate the effect RTW legislation has
on the degree of income inequality within a state, where higher Gini coefficients
correspond to higher degrees of income inequality:

Giniit = βo + β1RTWit + δΖit + λt + αi + εit
12

(2)

The other independent variables in this model (δΖit) are population density,
unemployment rate, educational attainment at the collegiate level, union membership
rates, and gross state product. Time trends (λt ) were used in both models to control for
both the upward trend in per capita disposable income and the upward trend in income
inequality over time. State fixed effects (αi) were used to control for unobservable
characteristics within the states that most likely did not change over time but that may
have an effect on the dependent variables. Standard errors (εit) in both models were
clustered at the state level.
I expect to find no significant change in per capita disposable income levels and
no significant change in income inequality due to the enactment RTW legislation. Union
membership rates are likely to fall after RTW legislation is passed in a state, but the
percentage of employees covered under a collective bargaining agreement is not likely to
change as a result of this legislation. In practice, companies rarely distinguish between
union members and nonmembers when dealing with wages and benefits. So, even if an
employee chooses not to join a union and pay union dues, that employee is likely still
covered under the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the union and the
company (Sherk 2015). Therefore, union coverage rates are not as likely to fluctuate
when RTW legislation is passed in that state, meaning that there should be no short-run
effect on the income inequality within these states despite any changes that occur in
union membership rates.
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CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS

Regression results from the model used to estimate real per capita disposable
income can be found in Table 3. A simple regression found in Column 1 finds that RTW
states have lower per capita disposable income levels on average than states which do not
have this legislation. When controlling for other variables such as population density,
employment rates, educational attainment, union membership rates, and gross state
product, there emerges a significant positive relationship between RTW legislation and
per capita disposable income levels. The model used in Column 3 controls for the overall
upward trend in real per capita disposable income levels using a time trend. While the
positive impact of RTW is smaller when controlling for changes over time, the model is
Column 3 suggests that RTW legislation could add about $1,442 to real per capita
disposable income.
However, when using state fixed effects along with these controls, this
relationship dissolves and we see no statistically significant relationship between RTW
legislation and per capita disposable income, as shown in Column 4. The models used in
Column 4, Column 5, and Column 6 employ state fixed effects to control for unobserved
characteristics of the states that might also impact per capita disposable income levels.
There continues to be no relationship between RTW legislation and per capita disposable
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income levels no matter how the model controls for time, whether by using year dummy
variables or a time trend in conjunction with state fixed effects.
The regressions in these Column 5 and Column 6 specifically examine the three
states which passed RTW legislation within the time period: Oklahoma, Indiana, and
Michigan. In Column 5 we can see that there is a significant positive relationship
between RTW states and per capita disposable income, but this regression does not
control for time. Column 6 shows no relationship between RTW legislation and per
capita disposable income levels when time controls are used in the model.
The regression results for the second model to estimate income inequality can be
found in Table 4. Column 1 shows the results of a simple linear regression using Gini
coefficients as the dependent variable and only post RTW has the independent variable.
As you can see from Column 1, RTW states have higher levels of income inequality than
non-RTW states by about 1.3%. Once other variables, such as population density,
unemployment rate, educational attainment, union membership rates, and gross state
product, are controlled for, there is an even stronger positive relationship between RTW
legislation and income inequality. However, due to the overall increase in income
inequality in the United States that began in the 1980s (Frank 2014), any model that does
not utilize some sort of time trend to control for this is likely to suffer from omitted
variable bias and overestimate the effect of RTW legislation on income inequality.
The most extensive models used to estimate income inequality are found in
Column 4, Column 5, and Column 6. All three models use state fixed effects and the
multiple control variables listed above as well as a time trend or year dummy variables.
The regression shown in Column 4 examines all fifty states and the District of Columbia
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and shows that RTW legislation had no statistically significant impact on income
inequality when one controls for the upward trend in income inequality in the U.S.
The regressions shown in Column 5 and Column 6 examine only those three
states that changed to RTW states within the time period. As shown by the results in
Table 4 when comparing these columns, the relationship between RTW legislation and
income inequality is very sensitive to how one controls for the upward trend in income
inequality in the United States. The regression in Column 5 uses a time trend to control
for the overall increase in income inequality found in each state over time and finds no
statistically significant correlation between RTW legislation and increases in income
inequality. Column 6 uses year dummy variables to control for this trend, but finds a
significant positive relationship between RTW legislation and income inequality within
the three states that most recently passed RTW legislation.
The fact that the results are so sensitive to how the model controls for time
variables calls these results into question. Since the regressions in Columns 5 and 6 only
examined the states that recently passed RTW legislation, these results are from an
incredibly small sample and should not be regarded as absolute. If the increase we see in
income inequality is legitimate, this could be evidence that there is a short-run increase in
income inequality for states soon after RTW legislation is passed. I hypothesize that this
increase in income inequality could be a short-run phenomenon because of the lack of
evidence from the model used in Column 4 that examined income inequality in all states
and not just the most recent three states that passed RTW legislation.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

One of the most common arguments against RTW legislation is that it leads to
greater income inequality by resulting in a reduction in the wages of low-skilled workers.
According to the data presented here, there is no statistically significant difference in the
degree of income inequality within states that pass RTW legislation. When looking solely
at the three states that passed RTW legislation within the period from 1997 to 2014, we
can see a significant positive correlation between RTW legislation and income inequality
for these states. However, since this result is not present when all states are considered,
including states that have been RTW states for decades, this result should be examined
critically due to the small sample size. If this result has merit, I hypothesize that the
relationship between RTW legislation and income inequality is short run. In the longterm, I conclude that RTW legislation does not have any significant effect on income
inequality within a state when controlling for time and other variables affecting
inequality. There was also no significant change in real per capita disposable income
levels for states which passed RTW legislation when time variables are employed in the
model, meaning that the after-tax income per citizen in RTW states did not change as a
result of RTW legislation.
The positive effects of RTW legislation might potentially be dwindling as the
manufacturing sector contributes less and less to a state’s overall gross state product. A
17

state considering passing RTW legislation now would most likely not receive the same
economic benefits of a state which passed such legislation in the 1940s or 1950s. An
extension to this research would be to look at dates prior to 1997 to determine if the
economic benefits of RTW legislation were greater in the past when the manufacturing
sector contributed more to the U.S. economy.
Another potential line of inquiry would be to examine a proxy measure for
industrial development and employment rates for states following a RTW policy change.
One of the main arguments in support of RTW legislation is that it attracts businesses to
the state, increasing the amount labor demanded, and by extension, wages. Revisiting this
study in later years would allow for the inclusion of states like Wisconsin and West
Virginia that only recently passed RTW legislation as there is currently not enough data
following the enactment of the legislation in these states to include them in the current
study.
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TABLES & FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Map of Current Right-to-Work States

Right-to-Work States
Non-Right-to-Work States
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES
Civilian Population
Percent Employed of Population
Educational Attain. (High
School)
Educational Attain. (College)
Gross State Product
Gini
Per Capita Disposable Income
Percent Covered by Union
Percent Union Member
Population Density

(1)
N

(2)
Mean

(3)
SD

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

867 4.420e+06 4.898e+06 365,527 2.979e+07
867
62.96
4.586
50
73
867
0.632
0.0386
0.526
0.733
867
867
867
867
867
867
867

0.185
268,694
0.593
31,149
13.13
11.70
296.5
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0.0461
323,815
0.0356
7,270
5.592
5.600
1,085

0.0979
19,517
0.521
17,277
3.300
2.300
0.742

0.453
2.056e+06
0.711
59,529
28.40
26.90
8,791

TABLE 2: Dates of RTW Legislation

Right-to-Work State

Date

Arkansas

November 07, 1944

Florida

November 07, 1944

Arizona

November 05, 1946

Nebraska

December 11, 1946

Virginia

January 12, 1947

Tennessee

February 21, 1947

North Carolina

March 18, 1947

Georgia

March 27, 1947

Iowa

April 28, 1947

South Dakota

July 01, 1947

Texas

September 05, 1947

North Dakota

June 28, 1948

Nevada

December 04, 1952

Alabama

August 28, 1953

Mississippi

February 24, 1954*

South Carolina

March 19, 1954

Utah

May 10, 1955

Kansas

November 04, 1958

Wyoming

February 08, 1963

Louisiana

July 09, 1976

Idaho

January 31, 1985

Oklahoma

September 02, 2001

Indiana

February 01, 2012

Michigan

March 08, 2013

Wisconsin

March 09, 2015

West Virginia

February 12, 2016

*Mississippi passed a statute in 1954, then a constitutional amendment in 1960.
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TABLE 3: Impact of RTW Legislation on Per Capita Disposable Income
(1)
PCDI

(2)
PCDI

(3)
PCDI

(4)
PCDI

(5)
PCDI

(6)
PCDI

-3,112***

3,790***

1,442**

-358.2

3,768**

-24.23

(1,100)

(1,096)

(578.9)

(547.3)

(743.0)

(390.9)

-1.069***

1.078***

5.163***

-312.6

-253.6

(0.213)

(0.326)

(1.174)

(454.5)

(125.1)

-290.6***

305.0***

632.7***

-868.6

388.4*

(67.87)

(82.98)

(84.51)

(431.7)

(106.9)

148,454***

55,189***

5,639

87,834**

-15,076

(9,116)

(13,272)

(9,541)

(14,277)

(8,570)

220.9*

278.7***

83.51

292.1

350.8*

(112.2)

(59.96)
1,223***
(65.03)

(85.87)
1,315***
(74.86)

(263.9)

Time

(105.5)
1,409**
(146.2)

Time
Squared

-8.154**

1.576

1.326

(3.926)

(3.922)

(6.711)

-2.44e-05

0.00177***

0.000894

0.131

0.0131

(0.000923)

(0.000648)

(0.00155)

(0.0848)

(0.0176)

-13,077***

-24,323***

59,886

12,093

VARIABLES
Post Right to
Work
Population
Density
% Employed
of
Population
Educational
Attain.
(College)
% Union
Member

Gross State
Product
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of
State_enc

32,485***

18,143***

(919.6)

(4,366)

(4,205)

(4,939)

(49,857)

(13,158)

867

867

867

867

51

51

0.045

0.637

0.892

0.959

0.874

0.988

51

3

3

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 4: Impact of RTW Legislation on Income Inequality

VARIABLES
Post Right
to Work
Population
Density
%Unemployed
Educational
Attain.
(College)
% In Union

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Gini

Gini

Gini

Gini

Gini

Gini

0.0131*

0.0222**

0.0191*

0.00588

-0.000460

0.0134**

(0.00707)

(0.0102)

(0.0104)

(0.00832)

(0.00849)

(0.00553)

1.43e-06

6.09e-06***

1.36e-05

0.00157

-0.00342*

(1.55e-06)

(2.13e-06)

(1.30e-05)

(0.00207)

(0.00194)

0.00364***

0.000169

-0.00126**

-0.00797***

0.00379

(0.000917)

(0.00117)

(0.000543)

(0.00238)

(0.00360)

0.145*

-0.0271

-0.158**

-0.306

-0.118

(0.0773)

(0.100)

(0.0639)

(0.258)

(0.145)

-0.000120

0.000277

-0.00139**

-0.00322

-0.00280*

(0.000833)

(0.000858)

(0.000702)

(0.00227)

(0.00140)

Year = 1998

0.0105
(0.00637)

Year = 1999

0.0165**
(0.00683)

Year = 2000

0.0151**
(0.00720)

Year = 2001

0.00387
(0.00764)

Year = 2002

0.000607
(0.0112)

Year = 2003

0.0113
(0.0140)

Year = 2004

0.0284**
(0.0137)

Year = 2005

0.0482***
(0.0138)
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Year = 2006

0.0625***
(0.0128)

Year = 2007

0.0712***
(0.0124)

Year = 2008

0.0705***
(0.0127)

Year = 2009

0.0407*
(0.0203)

Year = 2010

0.0242
(0.0221)

Year = 2011

0.0438**
(0.0180)

Year = 2012

0.0541***
(0.0176)

Year = 2013

0.0415**
(0.0184)

Gross State
Product

3.51e-08***
(8.57e-09)

Time
Time
Squared
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of
State_enc

3.80e-08***

9.62e-09

-8.40e-07***

(8.62e-09)

(1.84e-08)

(2.80e-07)

0.00462***

0.00493***

0.0153***

(0.00151)

(0.000687)

(0.00290)

-0.000103

-8.13e-05**

-0.000471***

(7.19e-05)

(3.38e-05)

(0.000119)

-3.57e-08
(2.76e-07)

0.587***

0.528***

0.543***

0.601***

0.697***

0.942***

(0.00491)

(0.0204)

(0.0219)

(0.0146)

(0.181)

(0.136)

867

867

867

867

51

51

0.033

0.264

0.336

0.361

0.726

0.950

51

3

3

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 5: Impact of RTW Legislation on Union Membership Rates

VARIABLES
Post Right to Work
Population
Density
% Employed of
Population
Educational
Attain. (College)

(1)
% Union Member

(2)
% Union Member

(3)
% Union
Member

-1.160
(0.734)

-0.932**
(0.189)

-0.892
(0.992)

-0.00381***

-0.186

-0.275

(0.000552)

(0.161)

(0.376)

0.0512

0.152

0.0411

(0.0438)

(0.0538)

(0.558)

6.023

-26.40

-28.00***

(5.688)

(11.47)

(1.426)
0.0938
(1.194)
-0.237
(1.539)
-1.195
(1.288)
-0.0613
(0.489)
-0.188
(1.872)
-1.136
(2.410)
-1.654
(2.397)
-1.680
(1.328)
-1.718
(1.784)
-1.294
(2.104)
-0.908
(1.551)
-0.825

Year = 1998
Year = 1999
Year = 2000
Year = 2001
Year = 2002
Year = 2003
Year = 2004
Year = 2005
Year = 2006
Year = 2007
Year = 2008
Year = 2009
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(2.644)
-1.787
(3.440)
-0.959
(3.598)
-1.167
(4.631)
-1.065
(4.548)

Year = 2010
Year = 2011
Year = 2012
Year = 2013
Gross State
Product
Time
Time Squared
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of
State_enc

3.09e-06**

2.04e-05

3.77e-05

(1.35e-06)
-0.286***
(0.0518)
0.00676***
(0.00204)
10.02***
(2.855)

(1.15e-05)
-0.249
(0.170)
0.0118
(0.0153)
22.98
(9.780)

(4.75e-05)

867
0.418

51
0.773

51
0.817

51

3

3

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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34.48
(58.52)

TABLE 6: Impact of RTW Legislation on Union Coverage Rates

VARIABLES

(1)
% Covered by Union

(2)
% Covered by Union

-1.143**
(0.258)
-0.237
(0.224)
0.147**
(0.0216)
-37.43
(13.22)
2.35e-05
(1.99e-05)
-0.249
(0.233)
0.0151
(0.0187)
30.24
(16.52)

-0.979
(0.922)
-0.00504***
(0.000637)
0.0582
(0.0495)
10.94*
(5.701)
2.74e-06**
(1.17e-06)
-0.345***
(0.0512)
0.00838***
(0.00236)
10.84***
(3.234)

51
0.734
3

867
0.422
51

Post Right to Work
Population Density
% Employed of Population
Educational Attain. (College)
Gross State Product
Time
Time Squared
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of State_enc
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

30

